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SENTENCING REFORM AND PAROLE
RELEASE GUIDELINES
ALBERT

W.

ALSCHULER*

Although parole release guidelines have achieved many of the advantages of determinate sentencing, they raise troublesome issues. Subject to important caveats, the
author maintains that sentencing guidelines can better be administered by courts
than by parole boards. He also maintains that current federal parole guidelines
unfairly disregard plea bargained charge reductions, and that the construction of
equitable guidelines requires detailed offense-by-offense and situation-by-situation
studies that have not yet been undertaken.

Amidst the furor over proposals for fixed and presumptive sentencing, something remarkable has happened. Parole boards, with the
United States Parole Commission in the lead and with several State
parole boards not very far behind,' have taken substantial steps toward solving the most important sentencing problems. The guidelines
that these boards have promulgated have emphasized, not an offender's dimly perceived progress toward rehabilitation, but the circumstances of his offense and his personal characteristics. Because
these circumstances and characteristics are known at the time that
an offender arrives at a correctional institution, the presumptive date
of his release can be determined shortly thereafter. In addition, this
release date can be promptly communicated to the prisoner.
This system of parole guidelines achieves many of the advantages that advocates of determinate sentencing have sought. When
guidelines effectively preordain the amount of time that an offender
will be required to serve, he has less to gain through hypocritical
efforts to curry favor with the parole board; he need not pretend to
be someone other than who he is; his prison experience becomes less
an exercise in mendacity; and rehabilitative programs are made available on a voluntary basis to inmates-motivated by a desire to change
rather than simply by a desire to manipulate correctional authorities.
Moreover, if "the very indeterminacy of indeterminate sentences is a
form of psychological torture,"' parole guidelines, by making the
date of parole relatively certain, reduce this torture substantially.
The guidelines also mark dramatic progress toward solving the
*
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This article is a revised version of testimony before the United States Parole Commission.
I. See A. VON HIRSCII & K. HANRAHIAN, TiE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM Oft ABOLITION? 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN1.
2. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique ofRecent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 553 (1978).
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problem of judicial sentencing disparity.3 The sentence that a trial
judge imposes is not a factor in the guidelines calculation, and except
in those relatively rare cases in which the judge imposes a sentence
that precludes the Parole Commission from ordering release on the
date suggested by its guidelines, the sentence imposed by the court
becomes an irrelevancy. One wonders, for example, whether the excitement generated by the Second Circuit Sentencing Study4 might
have been dissipated in part by determining the practical effect of the
seemingly disparate judicial sentences that the study revealed. Under
the Parole Commission's guidelines, these apparently unequal sentences might not have affected the length of incarceration at all.5 Of
course, no set of parole guidelines can reduce disparity in the most
important component of the judicial sentencing decision, the choice
between prison and probation; but it is significant that the most
ambitious of the State determinate sentencing statutes, those enacted
in California and Illinois,6 also have left the critical "in-out" decision
to the uncontrolled discretion of trial judges.
Despite these substantial benefits, our new regime of parole
guidelines raises troublesome questions. Parole boards were established, for the most part, in the early twentieth century as a concomitant of the Progressive Movement. The asserted justification for their
powers was that expert penologists, who could evaluate an offender's
conduct and his response to treatment in prison, could best determine
the appropriate moment for his release. With what Professor John
C. Coffee has called "remarkable candor for a bureaucratic agency," 7
the Federal Parole Commission has now recognized that determining
the "magic moment" when an offender has become rehabilitated is
beyond its capacity. The Commission's guidelines look, not to progress toward rehabilitation, but to factors that carl be assessed at the
time of the initial sentencing proceeding. As Professor Coffee puts
it, "To point out that the Emperor has no clothes raises a ticklish
dilemma when the party making the announcement is the Emperor."'
3. The reduction of judicial sentencing disparity was, in fact, one of the initial goals of
parole. See Messinger, Introduction, in A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note I, at XXXXI (quoting various statements of the CALIFORNIA STATE PENOLOGICAL COMMISSION
REPORT (1887)).
4.

A. PARKTRII)0G

& W. EDRIDIGE, TIlE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY (1974).

5. See Krislov, Debating on Bargaining: Comments from a Synthesizer, 13 LAW &
So(-'
6.

RlV. 573, 581 (1979).
CAL. PENAL CODE

§§

1170-1170.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1979)

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.

38, §§ 1005-3-1 to 1005-10-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
7. Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability. Predictability, and
Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission. 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 990 (1978).
8. Id.
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Do the Commission's guidelines remove the reason for its existence?
If the length of an offender's confinement is to be determined by the
seriousness of his offense, his prior record, and other characteristics
known at the time of sentencing, should the relevant determination
be made by a parole board or by the sentencing court?
One possible answer to this question looks to the fact that the
Parole Commission is a national agency and a relatively small, collegial body. It can reasonably be expected to apply its guidelines-and to articulate reasons for departing from the guidelines-in
a more uniform fashion than hundreds of federal district judges
throughout the land.9 This advantage may be outweighed, however,
by an advantage that courts possess in determining the length of
incarceration under a guidelines system. They are in a better position
to assess the relevant facts.
Consider the way in which the guideline revision that the Parole
Commission is now considering"0 would treat gambling offenses.
"Small scale" gambling violations-with an estimated daily gross of
under $5,000-are classed as "moderate" in terms of severity.
"Medium scale" gambling violations-involving operations with an
estimated daily gross of $5,000 to $15,000-are classed as "high"; and
"large scale" gambling violations-involving operations with an estimated daily gross of over $15,000-are classed as "very high." A
federal prisoner may have been convicted only of transporting some
gambling paraphernalia in interstate commerce," but if the Parole
Commission determines that he is a "large scale" gambler, he will
be incarcerated for a minimum of 26 months, more than twice as long
as if the Commission had found him to be a "small scale" gambler.
How, then, is the Commission to make this critical factual
determination? A presentence investigation report may contain no
estimate of the daily gross of a gambling operation, and when an
estimate is presented, it may be based on rumor that has grown with
every telling and on the crudest sort of conjecture. When a hearing
examiner confronts a prisoner with this estimate, the prisoner is likely
to dispute it; and then, on the basis of this limited "evidence," the
Commission must make its determination.
In my view, the prisoner should be entitled to more careful factfinding. If we can identify the daily gross of his illegal business as a
vitally important factor in determining the length of his incarcera9.
1978, at
10.
II.

See McCall, The Future of Parole-In Rebuttal of S.1437, FED.
3, 6-7.
43 Fed. Reg. 46859 (1978) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 2).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1976).

PROBATION,
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tion-if we have, in fact, "rationalized" the sentencing process to this
extent-the defendant should receive a hearing on the issue, and the
hearing should be one at which witnesses with direct knowledge of
the facts can be presented and cross-examined. Moreover, the government probably should bear the burden of establishing the determinative facts by a preponderance of the evidence." A sentencing court is
certainly in a better position to provide this sort of hearing than a
parole board, which must operate at a substantially greater'distance
in time and space from both the factual events that it is investigating
and the trial on the merits. Although the procedural safeguards of a
judicial sentencing hearing are significantly less than those of a trial,
this hearing offers a greater opportunity for careful evaluation of the
evidence than a parole board can realistically afford. In addition, the
current utility of judicial sentencing hearings would be notably enhanced by a guidelines system that brought the critical factual issues
into focus. In short, if the length of a prisoner's confinement is to be
based on facts that can be known at the time of the initial sentencing
proceeding, it seems better to evaluate those facts as part of this
proceeding than to judge them later as part of a proceeding before a
parole board.
A caveat to this conclusion is appropriate, however. To entrust
a factual determination to the court as a matter of law may often be
to entrust it to the prosecutor and defense attorney as a matter of
practice. Although a court is indeed in the best position to determine
the relevant facts, no bona fide adjudication of these facts may occur.
Instead the prosecutor may strike a bargain with the defense attorney: "I know that your client was taking $15,000 a day in bets, but if
he'll plead guilty and save me the bother of a trial, I'll stipulate that
his daily gross was only $4,999." Although a parole board may be less
able to adjudicate facts fairly and accurately than a court, its processes seem more likely to yield accurate factual determinations than
this sort of negotiation. If an offender's sentence should be deter12. Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), with Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967). These cases suggest that a State may be required to employ more elaborate
procedures when it turns sentencing decisions on specified standards than when it seeks the
benefit of discretionary decisions designed to take account of a multiplicity of factors whose
relationship and weight cannot be specified in advance. Although the approach of the Williams
and Specht cases may seem paradoxical-for it seems to "penalize" a State that makes the
basis for its sentencing decisions explicit-I believe that the approach remains sound. The
relevant principle is merely that a state must employ procedures appropriate to the goals that
it has itself selected. Moreover, to the extent that the argument to the contrary has an empirical
foundation, I doubt that a State legislature or other governmental body will often be disuaded
from specifying its goals by the prospect that this action will lead to new procedures that are
in fact appropriate to the goals selected. Also compare Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976),
with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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mined by his personal characteristics and the circumstances of his
crime rather than by the kind of bargain that he is able to strike, an
administrative hearing may well approach this goal more closely than
a staged judicial sentencing proceeding whose result has been predetermined by prosecutorial negotiations. With a restriction of plea
negotiation, however, my view is that the administration of a guidelines system would be better entrusted to the courts than to the parole
board; and even without a formal restriction of plea bargaining, my
best guess is that a sentencing guidelines system would not be substantially perverted by plea bargaining in most federal courts. As I
shall indicate, prosecutorial plea bargaining in the federal courts has
followed a different pattern from that in the State courts and, in the
main, has restricted judiciaJ sentencing discretion less severely.
The practice of plea negotiation raises a difficult instance of the
general problem of factual adjudication in sentencing. In determining
the severity of a prisoner's offense, the Parole Commission currently
looks to the historic circumstances of his crime as it perceives them
rather than to the label attached to his crime by a court.' 3 If, for
example, a person who has apparently committed an armed robbery
has been permitted to plead guilty to unarmed robbery or to larceny,
the Commission nevertheless places his offense in the "armed robbery" category when it -applies its guidelines. Although this practice
has been upheld by several courts," it raises substantial issues of
procedural fairness. First, a criminal defendant is likely to view the
plea bargaining process differently from the way in which the Commission views it. The Commission apparently believes that the function of a plea agreement is merely to limit the range of punishment
to which the defendant is exposed. If he has been confined no longer
than the court has authorized for the lesser offense to which he has
pleaded guilty, he has no basis for complaint merely because the
Commission has viewed him as factually guilty of a more serious
crime. The defendant, however, is likely to view his plea agreement
as embodying a different sort of undertaking on the part of the government-an agreement not to treat him as guilty of the more serious
offense whatever the historic facts. He may feel betrayed when this
13. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINE APPLICATION MANUAL app.
4.08 (United States Parole Commission Research Unit, at Report Sixteen, adopted by the
Commission as Appendix 4, UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION PROCEDURE MANUAL, May
1, 1978 [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINE APPLICATION MANUAL1.
14. Billiteri v. United States Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976), Bistram v.
United States Board of Parole, 535 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1976); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp.
156 (D. Conn. 1974); Manos v. United States Board of Parole, 399 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Pa.
1975).
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understanding proves inaccurate.
A second problem is that the Commission's factual determinations may on occasion be incorrect, or at least they may seem less
trustworthy than the factual determinations of a court. For example,
a defendant may have believed that he had a substantial defense to
the charge initially filed against him, but he may have agreed to
compromise this defense by pleading guilty to a lesser crime. If the
Parole Commission then proposes to treat him as guilty of the initial
charge, he may feel cheated, not merely because the government
departed from a fiction that it had apparently agreed to observe, but
because he has in fact been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to
present his defense. Although the Parole Commission may itself consider this defense, the defendant will not be able to present the same
evidence that he could have presented in court; the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt will not apply; and the safeguards
of a trial will be absent. The defendant will be likely to conclude that
he has been treated unfairly and, in the end, that the Commission
reached the wrong conclusion in deciding that he was guilty of the
more serious crime.
The apparent willingness of parole boards to "second guess" the
courts has produced some hostility toward them. The statement of a
defense attorney concerning the now disbanded California Adult Authority seems typical: "All the charges against a defendant may be
dismissed except one. But if the defendant is sentenced to the penitentiary and comes before the Adult Authority, those super-judges will
want to know all about the ten robberies."' 5 To this attorney, it
seemed presumptuous for a parole board to "find" a defendant guilty
of a particular offense when the court had refused to do so.
A somewhat similar problem arises when a jury has found a
defendant not guilty of some of the charges against him or has convicted him of a less serious crime than that initially charged. The
jury's verdict cannot fairly be read as a determination that the defendant was factually innocent of the charges filed against him; the
jury found only that those charges had not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because courts and parole boards are not restricted
by a reasonable doubt standard in resolving the factual issues that
may determine the length of an offender's confinement, it might be
theoretically proper to consider charges of which the defendant had
been acquitted in determining the length of his confinement on the
charges of which he had been convicted. Nevertheless, the Commis15. AIschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 96
(1968) (statement of Benjamin M. Davis).
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sion's Guideline Application Manual expressly forbids this practice."
The same sort of unfairness that the Commission saw in "counting"
offenses of which a prisoner has been acquitted applies in lesser degree to "counting" offenses that were dismissed in the plea negotiation process. It is noteworthy, in addition, that in assessing an offender's prior record for purposes of applying the "salient factor" portion of its guidelines, the Commission considers only prior convictions and not arrests or charges that were dismissed as part of the
plea bargaining process."7
Of course I have been sounding only one horn of a dilemma, and
there are substantial reasons for the Commission's current practice.
Judging the seriousness of a prisoner's offense while disregarding the
historic facts of his crime is a mind-boggling task. A prisoner may
have been permitted to plead guilty to.unarmed robbery although his
crime was apparently committed wif a loaded shotgun. How, then,
is the Commission to visualize his crime if it ignores the historic
facts-as a "typical" unarmed robbery, as an "aggravated" unarmed
robbery, as an unarmed robbery committed in the same circumstances as the armed robbery was in fact committed, or what?
More important than this conundrum is the fact that the Commission's practice does serve a useful purpose. An offender's punishment should indeed turn on the historic circumstances of his crime
and on his personal characteristics, not on whether he made a deal
to plead guilty to a lesser charge or instead exercised his right to trial.
The Commission's practice tends to reduce the inequality and irrationality that plea bargaining has introduced into our system of criminal justice, and it emphasizes the kinds of factors that should be
emphasized in a just sentencing system. Nevertheless, there exists
substantial tension between "contractual fairness" in a plea bargaining system and "substantive fairness" in sentencing, and the Commission has pursued the latter goal to the detriment of the former. Moreover, the Commission is ill-equipped to remedy the substantive defects of the plea bargaining process, for it cannot offer the careful
adjudication of the factual circumstances relevant to sentencing that
a court could provide. It may, indeed, make substantial errors. In my
view, there can be no satisfactory resolution of this problem without
the abolition of plea bargaining. In default of this solution, I believe
that the Commission should not judge a prisoner guilty of an offense
of which the courts should probably have convicted him but, owing
to the plea bargaining process, did not. I should add that this problem
16.
17.

GUIDELINE APPLICATION MANUAL,
Id. at app. 4.19.

supra note 13, at app. 4.08.
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seems substantially less intense in the federal system than in many
state courts. Although federal prosecutors are often willing to dismiss
some of the charges in a multiple-count indictment in exchange for a
plea of guilty, my impression is that they usually require a defendant
to plead guilty to a charge that fairly reflects the seriousness of his
conduct.' 8
Finally, a few words about a problem that is the special concern
of this hearing-the problem of grading the severity of offefises in a
guidelines system. To the extent that grading turns on facts not adjudicated by a court, the process poses a problem of procedural fairness-a problem of the extent to which the Commission can accurately determine the facts that it has made critical. But to the extent
that the Commission relies on traditional crime categories, its grading is likely to pose a different problem-one of substantive fairness
in sentencing. The crime categortes that legislatures create in defining
the conduct that they wish to prohibit may be different from the
classifications that should determine the extent of an offender's punishment.
In the area of property offenses, legislative classifications of
crime often seem too detailed to be helpful for sentencing purposes.
Under the proposed guideline revision, for example, "theft" of property valued at less than $1,000 is a "low" severity offense, and so is
the evasion of less than $1,000 in taxes. But "theft from the mail" of
less than $1,000 is a "low moderate" offense, and so is the theft of
less than $1,000 by fraud or embezzlement.'" I see no reason for these
fine-gauged distinctions.
With offenses against the person, the problem is usually the
reverse. Legislative classifications are likely to be too broad for sentencing purposes, and the Commission should often seek narrower
categories. Under the Commission's guidelines, for example, forcible
rape is placed in the "greatest I" category. 0 Yet forcible rape can
involve a brutal attack against a disabled stranger by a gang armed
with weapons, and it can also involve a threat to twist the arm of a
person who had voluntarily engaged in intercourse with the offender
on prior occasions and who had been receptive to his advances, up
to a point, on the occasion in question. Similarly, the guidelines
classify armed robbery as of "very high" severity without regard to
the number or character of the victims, the amount of property taken,
the motivation for the crime, the extent of the defendant's participa18. See Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part !, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059, 1078-79 (1976).
19. 43 Fed. Reg. 46,859, 46,861.
20. Id. at 46,865.
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tion, the type of weapon used, or a variety of other factors that might
easily become relevant."' All varieties of armed robbery and all varieties of rape may not belong in the same category; the Commission
might seek finer classifications than the legislature has employed.
No one has devised rules for sentencing on the basis of a detailed
consideration of the types of situations likely to arise within particular offense categories. It might be useful, however, to conduct studies
for the purpose of determining the extent to which generalizaton
regarding particular offenses is possible. One set of studies, for example, might be devoted specifically to the crime of armed robbery. An
agency might begin by gathering historical data on the amount of
time that armed robbers in each of the "salient factor" categories
have been required to serve-the same sort of historical data that
were used to construct the present guidelines. The agency might also
sample public opinion regarding the severity of particular crimes.
Then the agency might go beyond these data to examine the variety
of factual situations that have in fact arisen. Are some situations so
recurrent that specific rules should be promulgated for these situations alone? What factors influence our reaction to the variety of
cases, and can they be quantified? Discussion of particular cases and
their proper resolution might provide benchmarks from which a pattern could be discerned, or it might be decided that any generalization
would work unfairly in so many cases as not to be worth the effort.
The inquiry would be both descriptive and prescriptive, and the point
of the exercise would be to create "armed robbery experts" who
would understand the world of conduct that they were punishing
when they ultimately drafted their guidelines. Similar sets of studies
might concern theft offenses, rapes, burglaries, and so on. The task
would be long and difficult, but not as long and difficult as might at
first appear, and it would increase our sense that we knew what we
were doing when we finally wrote the rules. We could then promote
certainty in sentencing without the sense of arbitrariness that has
accompanied many of the current efforts to accomplish that goal.
In conclusion, a final virtue of the guidelines system should be
emphasized. The problems of grading the severity of offenses and of
factual adjudication in sentencing have always been present, but they
were long submerged in the amorphous, lawless, open-ended
decision-making that characterized 'both parole and judicial sentencing. The guidelines system has brought these issues into the open and
focused attention upon them, and that is all to the good.
21.

Id. at 46,864.
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